This essay engages the debate concerning the so-called 'Scotist rupture' from the point of view of Christology. The essay investigates John Duns Scotus's development of Christological doctrine against the strong Cyrilline tendencies of Thomas Aquinas. In particular the essay explores how Scotus's innovative doctrine of the 'haecceity' of Christ's human nature entailed a self-sufficing conception of the 'person', having to do less with the mystery of rationality and 'communion', and more to do with a quasi-voluntaristic 'power' over oneself. In this light, Scotus's Christological development is read as suggestively contributing to make possible a proto-liberal condition in which 'agency' (agere) and 'right' (ius) are construed as determinative of what it means to be and act as a person.
Introduction
In A Secular Age, Charles Taylor links the movement towards the selfsufficing 'exclusive humanism' characteristic of modern secularism with a reallocation of popular piety in the thirteenth century.
1 During that period a shift occurred in which devotional practices became less focused on the cosmological glory of Christ Pantocrator and more focused on the particular humanity of the lowly Jesus. Taylor suggests that this new devotional attention to the particular human Christ was facilitated by the recently founded mendicant orders, especially the Franciscans and Dominicans, both of whom saw the meekness of God Incarnate reflected in the individual poor among whom the friars lived and ministered. In this context, a new spiritual attention to the human individuality of Jesus was manifest, whether in the realism of the paintings of Giotto (so deeply associated with Franciscan spirituality), or in the new liturgical feasts centred on the suffering body of Christ, such as the feast of the Five Wounds and that of the Sacred Heart of Jesus (both of which were first celebrated in the thirteenth century by German Dominicans). 2 The new devotional focus on the individual human Christ, in principle, confirmed and did not contradict orthodox Chalcedonianism, that in the Incarnation the divine Logos hypostatically assumed a fully human nature as his own. Already in the early eight century John of Damascus held that the human nature assumed in Christ was assumed in atomo, that is, in individual form. 3 The hypostatic union was thus construed to have occurred in the assumption of this human nature and not of human nature in the abstract. Nevertheless, the new spiritual focus occasioned by the mendicants' piety drew fresh attention to the paradox of the relation of the universal and the particular, unity and difference, in the doctrine of the hypostatic union of the divine Logos of all things incarnated in a particular human being.
In this devotional context, Dominican Christology in the person of St Thomas Aquinas recommitted itself to affirming the traditional priority of the universal over the particular even within this new focus of piety on the particular humanity of Jesus. For Aquinas, in Cyrilline fashion, whatever particular 'humanness' there is in Jesus, this particularity 'is' only in virtue of the hypostatic union: even while Christ assumed a human nature in atomo, the term of individuation of this human nature resides wholly in the divine filiation of the eternal Son. 4 Thus, even while Jesus is a particular human (in atomo), nevertheless, he is not a human suppositum -he 'is' the Logos of God. 5 In this way Dominican Christology remained highly paradoxical. Franciscan Christology, by contrast, tended to confront the perceived aporia more directly, ambitiously rethinking the ontological status of the particular humanity of the Incarnate Son. 6 This can perhaps already be seen in St Bonaventure, who reconceived the status of the traditional rationes aeternae (the universal Platonic forms) as residing fully 'in' the individuated human nature of Jesus.
7 By contrast, the traditional conception of the rationes aeternae had tended to understand them, not so much 'in' the individuated human Jesus, but rather 'in' the person of the universal Logos (as Maximus the Confessor would have it, the many logoi are the one Logos and the one Logos is the many logoi). 7 See Bonaventure, In Sententias I, dist. 3, pt. 1, q. 1, ad 5. 8 For the doctrine of the logoi in the Logos, see Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum 7 (PG 91.1068D-1101C). The consequences of Bonaventure's reconception of the rationes aeternae is beyond the scope of this essay; however, Louis Dupré has suggested that it is precisely from henceforth that devotion to the particular 'human Jesus' could now in principle elide speculative knowledge in favour of knowledge of a concrete particular. The result of this shift, on Dupré's view, is that cognition now comes to consist 'in uniting a created image with its personal archetype, Christ, the synthesis of all ideas' (Passage to Modernity, p. 38). Thus Dupré suggests that the divine paradigms came to reside 'in' a particular such that they could now be 'grasped' in a way hitherto unconceivable. Under this condition knowledge could be reconfigured away from the mystical path of 'stretching towards' the abstract uncircumscribability of the universal, towards 'grasping' the singularity of circumscribed particulars. This situation is connected to how Lydia Schumacher, in another context, has suggested that illumination in Bonaventure, far from being simply an Augustinian renewal, is in fact a significant innovation on Augustine's The daring innovation occurred, however, not with Bonaventure, but a generation after him, when Bl John Duns Scotus posed a question for which Aquinas -inhabiting the high paradox of his doctrine of the Incarnation -had no need to raise: How can a divine person assume a human nature without assuming its normal human suppositum? That is, how does Christ assume a human nature in atomo without assuming the ontological conditions of a particular human person?
Boldly raising this perplexity at the heart of the traditional doctrine of the hypostatic union, Scotus sought to resolve it by granting new ontological significance to the particular human nature of the Incarnate Son, while attempting at the same time to clarify the terms in which this particular human nature nevertheless failed to be a person or posess its own suppositum. This article concerns the solution Scotus offered to the legitimate perplexity he raised. In this article I will argue that, even while Scotus's perplexity was legitimate, his manner of resolving it risked transforming devotional attention to the individual Christ into a means of underwriting a subjective self-sufficiency based doctrine, and more, that it anticipates the later Scotist rejection of illumination all together (Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge [Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011]). On Schumacher's view, Bonaventure installs a 'metaphysics of exemplarity' to replace the traditional 'metaphysics of participation', represented for her by Anselm and Augustine. On the Bonaventurian scheme, according to Schumacher, 'knowing' is reconfigured in a way that anticipates the shift to epistemology insofar as it now approximates something more along the lines of the grasp of individual 'facts' rather than the way of fides quaerens intellectum. All this can be contrasted with the noetic way of Aquinas, for whom the journey of the mind is not one of discrete apprehensions, but rather a total illumination of the mind towards the horizon of unequalisable truth. This leads John Milbank to suggest that Bonaventure 'both apriorises the presence of illumination in the human mind and tends to reduce the divine causation of human mental light to mere efficiency' ('The Grandeur of Reason and the Perversity of Rationalism: Radical Orthodoxy's First Decade', in Simon Oliver and John Milbank [eds], The Radical Orthodoxy Reader [London: Routledge, 2009 ], pp. 367-404, at p. 380). On Milbank's reading, Bonaventure turns out to be less committed to participation than Aquinas, which, in turn, suggests that the Seraphic Doctor already anticipated Scotus's 'break' with the metaphysics of participation and illumination, and its replacement with a univocal conception of being on the one hand and an epistemology of 'representation' on the other. Cf. Jacob Schmutz, 'La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure (xiii e -xvii e siècles) ' on a construal of the person as an exigency of the self to act on his or her own initiative. In other words, Scotus's solution, it would seem, contributed to 'make possible' a Christian construal of the person in terms of an autonomy of the self in 'affective-volitional and cognitive relations with God and others'. 9 To this end, the essay aims at a Christological contribution to the emerging theological consensus concerning what Olivier Boulnois has termed the 'Scotist rupture'.
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The Scotist Rupture Central to conceiving this 'Scotist rupture' is the option of Scotus on behalf of a univocal conception of being. Following Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Scotus held that metaphysics is the science of being qua being (ens in quantum ens). 13 Beyond Ibn Sīnā, Scotus specified for himself that 'being' ought to signify the fundamental concept of whatever 'is' in its 'minimal common structure' 14 -that is, 'being', for Scotus, is prior conceptually to every distinction of being, including the distinction that maintains between God and creatures. 15 In this way, Scotus sought to articulate a metaphysical vision that could be construed in contradistinction to the 'analogical' view of Thomas Aquinas. 16 It is not that Scotus held that God and creatures 'are' in exactly the same sense; he did not. And therefore he did not hold that being itself is univocal. Rather for Scotus, if we are to think 'metaphysically', then we must conceptualise being in a mode that is univocal to all things that 'are'. Within the realm of metaphysical speculation, therefore, Scotus held that all things that 'are' -including God -must objectively fall under the unity of conceptual being. This meant, from a metaphysical point of view, that when we say God 'is' we should do so without needing to recognise that he is either 'infinite' or the creator of the universe.
Rudi te Velde has shown how Scotus's univocal conception of being differs from the analogical vision of Aquinas in two crucial ways. First, while Aquinas likewise understands metaphysics as the science of ens in quantum ens, his understanding of 'being' nevertheless differs from Scotus to the extent that he understands being in terms of actus essendi. This means that, for Aquinas, having being is 'being in act', which means that whatever 'is' -insofar as it has 'being' -manifests some degree of perfection related to the fullness of being itself, the actus purus which is the source of being. Attendant to this first difference is a second: for Aquinas the consideration of ens in quantum ens 'does not prescind from the difference between infinite and finite being'. 17 God alone is ipsum esse per se subsistens. Therefore, in the words of te Velde, 'the being that is God is not so much included within the universal conceptual horizon of "being qua being"; God is the name of the cause of all beings in so far as they are being'.
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On the analogical view, what ultimately distinguishes created being from God is 'participation'. God alone is self-subsisting, while creatures 'are' insofar as they live, move and have their being in the one who is himself the source of all being (cf. Acts 17.28). Creatures are not understood as 'fixed' self-sustaining substances, but as existences subsisting through an anteriorly receptive participation in and to the gift of God, the 'infinite and indeterminate sea of substance' (pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum). 19 What distinguishes God and creatures thus is the fact that God simply 'is' while creatures 'are' only through the continuous and sustaining gift of God himself. On the univocalist view, by contrast, what pre-eminently differentiates God and creation is an 'intensity' of being possessed by a particular being of which the gulf between 'infinite' and 'finite' is maximal. In this way, the 17 univocalist view -conceptually reducing being to 'the bare fact of existence' 20 -tends to weaken the sense of created being as 'participating' in God. Or, to put it otherwise: on the analogical view the being of the creature and God is logically non-contrastive, since the creature exists precisely to the measure of its relational dependence upon the existence of God; while on the univocalist view the being of God and of creatures tends to be construed contrastively, to the extent that the creature's participational existence in relation to God is no longer understood as the definitive term of the difference of created being as such. The 'univocity' Scotus proposed as a mere 'conceptual scheme' within the realm of metaphysical science, thus tends to colonise our view of reality, morphing from a purely 'logical' and/or 'semantic' claim (as it was for Scotus) into an ontological claim about the nature of reality itself (as it became for post-modern atheist 'Scotists'). The 'univocity of being' is thus, as Conor Cunningham describes it, the 'pregnant implication' of what Scotus intended and formulated as a merely conceptual stance. 21 This 'pregnant implication' has led both Scotus's theological detractors and his atheistic champions alike to maintain that his univocalist reconception of being is the organic condition of the possibility of 'bracketing of God'. Cunningham's analysis of the 'pregnant implication' of Scotus's conceptual univocity of being is attentive to the subtle way Scotus is not yet proposing univocity as a mode of being in which God and creatures exist in the same way (this, rather, is the 'pregnant implication' of Scotus's conceptual shift, to be completed by later generations). Cunningham's careful distinction is essentially convertible with the judgement of Kevin Hart: 'Contrary to what many critics say, Scotus did not contend that there is no difference between the being of God and the being of creation. Only God exists by virtue of his essence, Scotus teaches, and we exist only because we participate in God. Without a universal idea of being [i.e. the univocal conception that entails a 'pregnant implication'], we could not prove the existence of God: we would always be in search of some way of holding together infinite and finite being in our minds. The Thomist school fiercely disagreed with the Franciscan teacher, and insisted that there is no universal idea of being, only an analogy of being between God and his creatures' The placement of the figure of Scotus at the heart of this dissociation of sensibility should not be construed as an ad hominem indictment of a man the Church now dares to name 'blessed'. 23 Neither should the diagnosis of this 'rupture' be understood as suggesting that the objective of Scotus himself was to entail the immanentising forces his theological critics and atheistic followers conclude he did play a crucial role in unleashing. Rather the argument on behalf of a 'Scotist rupture' is an appraisal concerning -not what was entailed necessarily -but what was 'made possible' by the intellectual innovations of a figure who stood at a crossroads on the trajectory of Western religious thought. The passage from a metaphysics of participation -still felt in the analogical vision of Aquinas -passes through Scotus in a decisive way before it narrows towards the horizon of materialist atheism. As Catherine Pickstock writes:
The significance of Duns Scotus' contribution is not that he is the sole inaugurator of transformations in theoretical speculation, Toscano, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation Between Kant and Deleuze (New York: Palagrave, 2006). Toscano's subtle and concrete understanding of the 'Scotist revolution' in the ontology of individuation (i.e. the doctrine of haecceitas) is attentive to how Scotus made possible the transcendental idealism of Kant, which, in turn, made possible the 'ontology of anomalous individuation' Toscano reads in Deleuze, who, through deploying a Scotist logic, is able to preserve the unity of being and concept 'from the standpoint of individual difference' (p. 10). This new 'science of being' -from Scotus to Deleuze -becomes for Tuscano truly 'scientific' to the extent that it achieves indifference to the real articulations of being, the generations of individuation and ultimately the question of divine causality. Daniel Smith summarises the advantage of Scotus to Deleuze (which can be applied to Toscano as well): 'As formulated by Duns Scotus, … [the doctrine of the univocity of being] says that the term "Being" is always used univocally … [And thus it] entails the radical denial of any ontological transcendence, and for this reason was a highly heterodox -and often heretical position because it hinted at pantheism or even atheism … Deleuze suggests that the tradition of univocity was continued in Spinoza, for whom God and Nature are one and the same thing, and then in Nietzsche. In this sense, univocity can be read as the medieval ontological version of the "death of but rather that he is one figure among many -although a crucial one -in a general shift away from a focus upon the metaphysics of participation (which he tended to reduce to a matter of external imitation rather than intrinsic 'sharing in'), and he is noteworthy in particular because he gave attention to these issues in a comprehensive fashion. No scholar could deny that such a shift occurred … Whatever one's position with regard to specific texts, one must perhaps take a position in relation to this generally acknowledged shift away from participation and its relative importance or otherwise. Put briefly … Duns Scotus and his successors, within an approach seeking … for complex reasons to emphasise the sovereignty of God and the primacy of scripture, opened a space for univocal treatment of finite being without regard to theology, rational or revealed. Although this space was not immediately exploited in a secularising fashion, in the long run this came to be the case. 24 The claim, therefore, is that a univocal conception of being tends to contract the horizon of created being to an immanence lacking transcendent depth because no longer understood as participating necessarily in God. Further, the argument runs, created being in that it is now thinkable in abstraction from the cause from which it emanates (conceptually breached form the constitutive creator-creation relation), comes to be thought in terms self-enclosed and abstracted from the transcendent origin, which, in turn, results in a loss of the sense of the constitutive communion of creaturely participation as the mode of 'horizontal' inter-connectedness of creatures with each other. Moreover, in the subordination of God and creatures to an abstract category of 'being', what risks bearing the whole burden of distinguishing between God and creatures (and creatures with creatures) is an 'intensity of being' construed in terms of 'power' or 'will'. 25 Hence, whereas for Aquinas God wills the good in conformity with God's wisdom which approves the good because God is goodness itself (i.e. what God wills is subject to God's own 'law' of goodness); 26 for Scotus, by contrast, God's will is the cause of goodness sheerly by the fact of God's willing it (i.e. whatever God wills is de facto made 'law'). 27 God's transcendence is thus construed more in the direction of 'juridical sovereignty' and less in terms of the gratuitous gift of being as given out of the source of being itself. This situation has led Pope Benedict XVI to register his own concern:
In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which, in its later developments, led to the claim that we can only know God's voluntas ordinata. Beyond this is the realm of God's freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done. This gives rise to positions which … might even lead to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness. 28 With these metaphysical issues in the background, I shall now explore how certain of Scotus's theological innovations in the realm of Christology may further contribute to the trajectory of the 'Scotist rupture' towards a more secularised sense of the self and the world. But first, as a counterpoint to the Christology of Scotus, we turn to the Christology of Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas against homo assumptus Christology
Thomas Aquinas was the first scholastic of the Latin Middle Ages to quote directly from the conciliar texts of Ephesus (431), Chalcedon a certain mediaeval innovation concerning the conception of God, which means that the essential paradigm of liberalism -'the valorization of the prerogatives of the individual subject … (and) that subject's right to chose' -is in fact rooted in a heterodox conception of God (p. 15). 30 to the inheritance of the Greek conciliar tradition. Positively, this recovery led Aquinas to take an increasingly 'Cyrilline' position on the unity of Christ. Negatively, it led Aquinas to take a progressively more hostile view of the Christology of his own age. 31 Over the course of his life, Aquinas became convinced of Latin Christology's perennial tendency to occupy a more or less 'Nestorian' position, especially to the extent that it tended to accommodate rather easily the homo assumptus position delineated by Peter Lombard, the first of Peter's three so-called opiniones of the union of divinity and humanity in Christ. 350-428) . In his theology of the unio of Christ, Theodore aimed to reconcile the Nicene emphasis on the unum Lord Jesus Christ (e/ ( na Ku/ rion ) Ihsou= n Xristo/ n) with his own sense of the Incarnation as an 'indwelling' (e) noi/ khsij) of the Word in the 'assumed' (lamba/ nw) human being, viz. homo assumptus. 34 Peter does not cite Theodore, who nevertheless stands in the background of the theory he describes as holding that 'in the Incarnation of the Word a … human being began to be God, not in the nature of God, but in the person of the Word'.
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According to this theory, the union of divinity and humanity in Christ is established by a special 'identity' of essence between the Logos and the 'assumed human being', an identity rooted in the assumed human's may 'correspond to ideas passed on from master to disciple: Diodore to Theodore to Nestorius' (p. 111), but it is representative of 'none of the sense of some sort of compelling movement that the notion of a school suggests' (p. 111). So when I write of the 'so-called "Antiochene school"' I mean nothing more than the common Christological tendency that can be associated with the three figures of Diodore, Theodore and Nestorius, which was always more marginal and idiosyncratic than the contemporary designation of a 'school' suggests. By contrast, the situation with the so-called 'Alexandrian school' is precisely the opposite: the thrust of the position associated with 'Alexandria' can 'be found throughout Greek theology: from the learned theology of the Cappadocians to the simple, though profound, insights of the author of the homilies attributed to St Macarius' (p. 111) and is thus far more universal than the term 'school' tends to suggest. receptivity to the abiding power of the Word. Thus the homo assumptus theory offered by Peter Lombard tends to minimise the ontological unity of humanity and divinity in Christ to the extent that the particular property of a human nature -'a certain human being' -is assumed into union with the divine person of the Son but not necessarily constituted in its suppositum by that person. Aquinas was, from the time of his commentary on the Sentences in the 1250's, suspicious of the homo assumptus doctrine, which he initially judged merely contrary to the common opinion of tradition but not necessarily a repudiation of that tradition. However, over the course of his life, Aquinas increasingly became hostile to the homo assumptus doctrine to the point that he finally rejected it tout court as a condemnable re-emergence of Nestorianism. As Martin Morard has shown, this radicalisation of Aquinas's position against the principle of homo assumptus follows directly from the impact of his discovery, in the early 1260's, of the acts of Constantinople II. 36 Through his study of Constantinople II, Aquinas became emboldened in his condemnation of Christological dualism, to the point that, in his mature Christology, he rejects the homo assumptus theory with the condemnation of the Anathematismi adversus "tria Capitula" itself:
If anyone … tries to introduce into the mystery of Christ two supposits (duas subsistentias) or two persons (duas personas) and then talks of one person only in respect to dignity, honour or adoration … let him be anathema. There has been no addition of person or subsistence to the Holy Trinity (nec enim adiectionem personae vel subsistentiae) even after the incarnation of one of its members, God the Word. Positively, for Aquinas, the logic of the doctrine of Constantinople II reinforced his own theology of the mode according to which the hypostatic unity of humanity and divinity in the Son must ontologically precede the individuation of the Son's human nature. There can be, for Aquinas, no 'human nature' of Christ apart from its hypostatic union to the Word. 38 This man 'Jesus' only exists as the divine person of the Son. The 'newness' of the Word becoming flesh thus occurs, for Aquinas, wholly on the side of the human nature in which the Son newly came to subsist. 39 This means -rather shockingly under the new devotional attention to the particular humanity of Christ -that whatever particular 'humanness' there is in Jesus, this particularity is, nevertheless, only 'real' in virtue of the hypostatic unity of this nature to the person of the Word, such that the term of individuation of 'this' human nature simply is the divine filiation of the eternal Son. 40 For Aquinas, therefore, there is no 'human nature' of Christ apart from that nature's hypostatic union to the Word since, as Romanus Cessario puts, 'the person of the Word pre-exists, Christ's created human nature does not constitute his person but rather joins it'. 41 In this way Aquinas, without using the language of 'enhypostatos' (e) nupo/ statoj), 42 humanity of Christ has no independent subsistence of its own but is hypostatic, or personally real, only as the human nature of the Son of God'. 45 The individuation of Christ's human nature is therefore fully contingent on the enhypostatisation of the Logos. Or, as Aquinas put it, in the Incarnation 'the eternal being of the divine Son (esse aeternum filii Dei) ... becomes the being of man (esse hominis), inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the divine Son in the unity of person'. 46 Thus every gesture towards granting the created nature of Jesus the status of an autonomously individuated existent (esse) involves a necessary shift towards a problematically dualistic position. There is only one esse in Christ, the divine esse of the eternal Son. Aquinas holds to this basic logic: the Incarnate Word is one subject subsisting hypostatically; and while the human nature of Jesus is a particular substance, it does not possess a propria personalitas and so cannot be another hypostasis or suppositum.
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Against this dogmatic backdrop, Aquinas was compelled to judge the homo assumptus theory a variant of Nestorian heresy.
48 And yet the homo assumptus theory remained un-condemned and thus an acceptable opinionem of Latin Christology. Broadly accepted in Aquinas's day, the homo assumptus doctrine flourished moreover in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries among theologians of a so-called 'Scotist' variety. 49 Haecceity and the particular Christ Writing a generation after Aquinas, John Duns Scotus conceived his Christology in qualified opposition to the single esse Christology of Aquinas. Whereas Aquinas was concerned to foreclose the heretical 45 dualism he detected in the Lombardian homo assumptus doctrine, Scotus was motivated in his doctrine of the hypostatic union to resolve a different perplexity: How does Christ assume a human nature in atomo without assuming the ontological conditions of a particular human person? It is not that the unum of Christ is of no concern to Scotus, very much to the contrary. Neither is it the case that the particularity of Christ's humanity is of no interest to Aquinas, the thirty three detailed questions of the Summa that make up the Vie de Jesus are evidence to the contrary. 50 Rather the dichotomy between Aquinas and Scotus here lies, fundamentally, in two different starting points. Whereas Aquinas started from the divine unum of the humanity in the divine Logos, Scotus sought to account first for the particular distinction of the individual human nature of Jesus apart from direct appeal to that unum. Scotus's solution to the perplexity he raised thus led him to perform, what Richard Cross has described as, 'an explicit reification of Christ's human nature'. 51 Thus, whereas for Aquinas the hypostatic union so constitutes the ontological reality of Jesus's humanity to the point that even the cadaver of Jesus in the tomb only 'is' to the extent that it is in unio with the divine Logos, 52 for Scotus, by contrast, the hypostatic union does not constitute the reality and being of Jesus's individuated human nature in any exceptional way such that the 'Word could put off his human nature without anything absolute in it being destroyed'. 53 In other words, for Scotus, it was in principle possible that Jesus could have existed apart from the hypostatic union.
Drawing on the Damascene's notion of Christ's human nature as a nature assumed in atomo, 54 Scotus held that the human nature assumed by the Logos must conform to the definition of human nature given in all other cases: an instantiation of human nature defined exclusively in terms applicable to the hypostatic union would not suffice. This led Scotus to offer two innovations into the mediaeval theology of his 50 day. 55 (1) Scotus proposed a new conception of 'individuation' that does not define individuality either as a material or an accidental feature of being, but rather as a quasi-essential aspect of being, not in the sense of 'pertaining to the order of essence' but rather as a kind of formality (but not a 'form'); this aspect Scotus called haecceitas ('thisness').
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(2) Scotus sought to demonstrate how an individuated rational nature need not itself be conceived as a person, but instead could be the nature of another kind of person (i.e. a fully individuated nature could be assumed by a person of another nature). 57 Thus beyond the traditional Chalcedonian distinction of natura (fu/ sij) and persona / suppositum (u( po/ stasij), Scotus introduced haecceitas as a 'third term' of distinction midway between the traditional two. Further, he conceived haecceitas as actualising nature in such a way that a human nature could now be conceivably individuated without necessarily being a person. Indeed Scotus would thus drain persona of the prior ontological density it traditionally entailed, now imputing this directly to the haecceity of haec natura, the ultimate positive constituent of existing being. 58 In this way Scotus attempted to avoid both the exceptionalism he perceived in Aquinas's single esse doctrine and the problem of Nestorianism. But this he achieved at a price. As Louis Dupré argues: the effect of 'Scotus's solution' was to detach human 'nature' from its traditional link with 'a divine destiny' such that, in contrast to the patristic sense of human nature ordered to theosis, Scotus's nature remains neutral with respect to destiny: either it may be assumed into an adoptive sonship of God in grace, or it may follow its normal course to the formation of a purely natural human person. Thus, in Scotus's artificial construction, intended to protect the concept of human nature from breaking under the weight of Two consequences follow from this: (1) Nature / immanence is now 'abstracted' from the supernatural / transcendent such that the attendant metaphysical dualism of the doctrine of natura pura is now thinkable. 60 (2) Personhood is now reconceived in terms of an ontological minimalism having to do with (voluntaristic) 'power' over oneself.
Scotus's distinctive contribution to the conception of the person lies in the way he re-interprets Richard of St Victor's doctrine of incommunicabilis, 59 Dupré, Passage to Modernity, p. 175. 60 Cf. Bok, et al., 'More Than Just An Individual', p. 186: 'For Scotus … in human nature there is no tendency to depend on God (to be an incarnation of God); nor is obediential potency for dependence a kind of inclination or openness to be fulfilled. So whether or not there is a desiderium naturale in human nature, to Scotus's mind it is not connected with incarnation' (emphasis is Bok, et al.'s). Bok, et al. make this argument in direct opposition to early twentieth century 'Scotists' (such as Déodat de Basly) who mistakenly considered Scotus's position on the disposition of dependence of Christ's human nature as an actualisation of the natural inclination of human nature to the supernatural. As Bok, et al. show, the contrary is the case for Scotus: the hypostatic union does not technically reveal the ordering of human nature to the supernatural and Christ is not the exemplar of humanity's supernatural destiny. And yet, Scotus does, in some sense, have a doctrine of the natural desire of the human being to the supernatural (cf. Ordinatio, prol. pars 1, nn. 23 and 32). In contrast to neo-Thomism, moreover, there is in Scotus an appetitus naturalis of the human to beatitude -hence Henri de Lubac's famous deployment of Scotus's notion of the indispositus of human nature to the supernatural in support of his thesis of the désir naturel du surnaturel (cf. Le Mystère du surnaturel [Paris: Aubier, 1965], pp. 116-117, 151-152 and 242-244). However, the extent to which Scotus's indispositus supports the full depth and implication of de Lubac's position is another matter altogether. First of all, de Lubac never held -as Scotus and Jansenius did -that 'supernatural vision' is the 'natural end' of the human creature. For de Lubac, by contrast, following what he understood as the classical position of the Fathers held also by Aquinas, human nature is itself a paradox: aporetically this 'nature' possesses no 'natural' finis ultimus but is created, rather, for the 'supernatural' finis ultimus of visio Dei, which can only arrive as a gift of grace. Second of all, as Alan Wolter has pointed out, the appetitus naturalis of Scotus is not an act or operation but simply the term of 'an ontological relationship between any faculty (of the soul) and that which perfects it. … [Therefore] to speak of the natural appetite for beatitude as a "desire" or a "longing" … is to use purely metaphorical language' (Allan B. Wolter OFM, 'Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural', in The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus [London: Cornell University Press, 1990], pp. 125-147, here at pp. 140-41). Wolter's hereby suggests that the appetitus configuring it now in terms of independentia.
61 On Scotus's innovation, the anarchic irreplaceability of personal singularity is compressed into 'perseity' in order to open the ontological field of haecceitas, thus persona is reconceived as a self-sufficing autonomy of 'independent existence, free of any inclination to exist dependently'.
62 This is how Scotus conceived the ultima solitudo that, for him, defines the human person in terms of a double freedom: (i) freedom from 'actual' dependence, and (ii) freedom from 'dispositional' dependence. 63 Accordingly, Richard's definition is now mobilised in a very particular direction, which points back to another theological source: the fifth-century semi-Pelagian, Faustus of Riez.
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naturalis of Scotus is in fact closer to a species of the 'obediential potency' de Lubac was criticising than it is to the désir natural du surnaturel de Lubac was proposing -closer, that is, to 'velleity' than to the full blooded quelque chose de Dieu characteristic of the Lubacian thesis. In part the issue here turns on the complex way Scotus prioritises 'will' over 'reason', thus distinguishing the ordination of the will to the supernatural from the ordination of the intellect, which for Scotus is not ordained to the supernatural (Wolter, 'Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural', pp. 131-139). This leads to a problematic situation in which, as Rudi te Velde has shown, Scotus, in contrast to Aquinas, holds that there is no inclination in human nature to self-transcendency even while there is (aporetically) an inclination of the will to a transcendent object (viz. supernatural 'beatitude'). This makes no sense of the intellectual yearning of de Lubac, which even while it is an inclination of being, is fundamentally a yearning for universality in the form of divine illumination. Scotus's declension from the doctrine of divine illumination coupled with his resistance to emphasise any inclination to self-transcendency within the human person allows him to posit a God willed 'sufficiency' of finite being. Yet, for the human being, how can this be? How can human nature desire a transcendent beatitude without that desire being an inclination to self-transcendency? As te Velde shows, for Scotus the transcendent good is naturally willed -incredibly! -as an immanent good, and therefore not under the condition of any self-transcending élan of nature to the supernatural (see te Velde, 'natura In Seipsa Recurva Est: Duns Scotus and Aquinas on the Relationship between Nature and Will', pp. 155-170). Dissociated from the convenientia of the Incarnation on the one hand, and conceived in terms of a desire for an immanent good rather than 'illumination' on the other, Scotus's appetitus naturalis cannot be properly described as a transcending desiderium naturale to deification, a constitutive infrastructure of nature to open from within to what utterly transcends nature. In contrast to the 'ontological' conceptions of persona offered by Boethius and Richard, Faustus offered a 'juridical' model. 65 For Faustus, person signifies a 'right of power'. 66 What does this mean? It means that if a person holds power over another (such as a 'father' over a 'son', or a 'master' over 'slave'), the 'personhood' of that other is 'consumed' by the legal power of the one under whom the other is subjected legally. 67 For Faustus this follows since one juridical unit, as he understands it, can be made of many substances and yet itself constitute only one 'person' because the many substances are submissive to one dominating agent. On this scheme personhood is conceived in strictly voluntaristic terms, and thus deracinated from the ontological categories of 'nature' and 'substance'. As Faustus puts it: 'the person is juridical in the same way as a substance is natural' (persona res juris est substantia res naturae). 69 According to William's doctrine, the difference between hic homo and hic homo persona lies in a negation of properties such that a person is simply an individual human nature in 'the state of not being united to a higher thing'. 70 Thus
William links 'perseity' with 'dignity' in a straightforward way such that 'person' now consists of an incommunicable individual plus the distinction of 'dignity' which is now perfectly convertible with 'perseity': 'What guarantees perseity is the distinction of dignity. And the distinction of dignity is identified as the state of non-assumption by the Word'. 71 Faustian juridical autonomy in this way becomes internal to how William conceives the personal unity of Christ: the human nature of Jesus fails to be a 'person' because it is lacking the dignity of 'perseity', which has now replaced 'rationality' as the term specifying the nomen dignitatis of personhood.
Indebted to the Faustusian conception of the person (as he received it through William's 'negation doctrine'), Scotus fuses the juridical conception of the person with the incommunicability of ultima solitudo configured as independentia. 72 Of course, there is little reason to think that Scotus drew on the Faustusian genealogy for its own sake. Scotus was not interested to articulate a more autonomous version of personhood for sociological, political, metaphysical or even abstract theological reasons. Rather, the Faustusian conception in the form of the 'negation doctrine' is deployed by Scotus concretely for the sake of the expediency with which it safeguards the formal unio of the Incarnate Christ while, at the same time, offering ontological latitude from which to introduce the semi-substantial notion of haecceity, which Scotus thought necessary to uphold the ontological integrity of hic homo. The unwitting result of promoting this Faustusian conception of the person lies in its 'proto-liberal' privileging of agency (agere) and right (ius) over being (esse) . 73 This new 'proto-liberal' conception of the person ends by collapsing the mystery of the dignity of the person into 'perseity' thereby exhausting the person of its apophatic, rational The ontological minimalism of Scotus's conception of the hypostatic union laid the foundations for a misconstrual of his doctrine by later 'Scotists', who interpreted the Subtle Doctor in terms of a reinvigorated and openly homo assumptus doctrine. 75 Absorbing Cartesian and post-Renaissance concerns for the status of Jesus's human 'subjectivity', the French Franciscan Christologist Déodat de Basly extended Scotus's 'reification' of human nature to accommodate a psychological 'reification' which implied for him something like a parallel human 'self ' in the God-Man. 76 For Déodat, the haecceitas of hic homo legitimises two autonomous 'egos' in the Incarnate Christ. Thus the humanity of Jesus could be said to constitute an individual human being with a human 'I' distinct from the 'I' of the Word yet formally 'united' to the Word according to the doctrine of negation. Déodat's extension of Scotus, moreover, was articulated in terms of a self-described homo assumptus position (which he wrongly attributed to Scotus himself ). This, coupled with Scotus's notion of Christ's human nature as in principle fully individuated apart from its union with the Word, justified for Déodat a reapplication of the patristic doctrine of the communication of idioms in terms of a parallelism in which it was now possible to apply the doctrine 'indirectly' (communicatio idiomatum in obliquo). In this way Déodat seems to have suggested that Christ should be thought of as more fundamentally duo than unum. All of this was taken up and extended by Déodat's confrère, Léon Seiller, who argued that Jesus had a genuine human 'psychological personality'. 77 In these terms, in the case of Seiller, we see a distinct move towards a full-blown two-Sons Christology where the relation of two 'psychological personalities' are treated as autonomously predicable 'subjects'. As Seiller argues, in Jesus, 'God the Word is the subject adored, in no way the subject adoring … the subject prayed to, in no way the subject praying'. 78 The speculative questions raised by Déodat and Seiller concerning the status of the human psychology of Christ need not entail a heterodox position. If one specifies the ontological enhypostatisation of the human 'psychology' of Christ by the divine Logos such that the Logos itself wholly constitutes that 'psychology', one can, then, make a speculative distinction from which to speak of something like the human 'psychological personality' of Jesus. 79 Christ is truly human according to the patristic axiom 'that which is not assumed is not healed'; and the tradition holds that he has a fully human 'will', 80 which implies that he possesses likewise a fully human 'memory', 'imagination' and even 'consciousness'. As John of Damascus writes:
[C]orresponding to his two natures he has the twofold set of natural properties belonging to the two natures -two natural wills, the divine and the human; two natural operations, a divine and a human; two natural freedoms, a divine and a human; and wisdom and knowledge, both divine and human. 81 However, raising these aspects of 'full humanity' requires, as Thomas Joseph White has shown, careful and full analogical submission to the dyothelite doctrine of Constantinople III (680-681). 82 Key to a properly orthodox inquiry into the 'psychology' or 'consciousness' of Christ's human nature requires attention, therefore, to the mode by which the natural operations of Christ's human mind function only as constituted within (and in full submission to) the unity of Christ's divine person. This means that the speculative distinction of human consciousness, which is recognised by faith and thereby sanctioned as a valid notional question, nevertheless cannot be specified as intelligible existentially to us, as if that human consciousness possessed an autonomous ontological status. 83 Christ can only be perceived and spoken of as a concrete unity. Faith specifies (1) that he is the divine Logos, and (2) that he possesses two fully operative and distinct natures. Déodat and Seiller, unwittingly or not, posed these valid notional questions as if they were existential questions, and thus in terms that radically undermine the ontological and subjective unity of the Incarnate Christ, thus departing from a fundamental precept of orthodox Christology. If a homo assumptus tendency was a latent risk internal to Scotus's innovative quasi-Theodorian reification of Christ's human nature, the innovation became openly Nestorian in Seiller.
The radicalisation of Scotistic Christology in Déodat and Seiller led finally to the censure of Pope Pius XII in Sempiternus Rex (1951) . Published on the 1500 th anniversary of the Council of Chalcedon, the encyclical reaffirmed Cyrilline orthodoxy in terms of a tacit condemnation of this late Christological Scotistism. Accordingly Pius wrote against those who, desert the ancient teachings more than is right, and make an erroneous use of the authority of the definition of Chalcedon to support their new ideas. These emphasize the state and condition of Christ's human nature to such an extent as to make it seem something existing in its own right, and not as subsisting in the Word itself. But the council of Chalcedon in full accord with that of Ephesus, clearly asserts that both natures are united in 'one person and subsistence', and rules out the placing of two individuals in Christ, as if some homo assumptus, completely autonomous in itself, is placed by the side of the Word. 84 In no uncertain terms the doctrine of homo assumptus was rejected. This magisterial judgement was reiterated in 2006 by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which described homo assumptus Christology as 'incompatible with the Catholic faith which affirms the unity of the person of Jesus Christ in two natures, divine and human, 83 In the first place Sempiternus Rex sets a dogmatic limit that forecloses the later extension of Scotus by 'homo assumptus Scotists'. To be clear, Scotus himself does not fall under the Pian condemnation. Nevertheless, beyond the dogmatic limit of Sempiternus Rex, the encyclical can be read as an invitation to return more fundamentally to a Cyrilline notion of the unio of Christ. Pope Pius holds up, in this regard, the Christology of Thomas Aquinas:
He who descended, this is the same as he who ascended. By these words is signified the unity of the person of God and man. For the Son of God came down by taking human nature, but the Son of Man ascended according to his human nature to the sublimity of eternal life. And so he is the same Son of God who came down and Son of Man who went up. 86 In this light, the Cyrilline unity of Christ as it was articulated within the conciliar tradition and received by Aquinas is magisterially reaffirmed and offered as the fundamental soil of orthodox Christological speculation, which animated not only the traditional understanding of Jesus Christ but determined at the same time the classical Christian account of the relation of God and creation.
Robert Sokolowski has argued that even while the 'main focus of the early [Christological] councils … was on the being and the actions of Jesus', through the emergent grammar of Christological orthodoxy 'the church … determined its understanding of God and of the relationship between God and the world'. 87 Sokolowski writes: The Council of Chalcedon, and the councils and controversies that led up to it, were concerned with the mystery of Christ, but they also tell us about the God who became incarnate in Christ. They tell us first that God does not destroy the natural necessities of things he becomes involved with, even in the intimate union of the incarnation. 88 Traditional Christology thus affirms that proximity with God to the point of unio enhances and does not weaken the integrity of a particular created nature. This Christological insight has deep implications for how we conceive the metaphysical distinction that must nevertheless maintain between God and individual created beings. Sokolowski terms this the 'Christian distinction', which involves 'the denial that God in his divinity is part of or dependent on the world'. 89 In a phrase, the entailment of conciliar Christology necessitates that 'the Christian God is … not a "kind" of being at all'. 90 This makes possible a rethinking of the relation of God and creation such that 'difference' and 'unity' can now perfectly coincide (inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter). Because humanity is truly accomplished in the hypostatic unity of this human nature subsisting wholly in the person of the Son of God, therefore the relation of the human being to God is not one in which the integrity of humanity is compromised by unio; but to the contrary, union with God perfects the difference (maior dissimilitudo) that nevertheless paradoxically maintains between God and creation. 91 in 'pagan religion' all distinctions are made 'within the context of the world or the whole, the matrix of being in which one thing comes forward as differentiated from others'. 94 On the pagan scheme (of which the modern liberal scheme is a variant), sameness and otherness, the one and the many, God and the world relate always and only 'within a setting that is ultimate'. 95 Within this 'ultimate' setting, terms of distinction are distinguishable to the extent (and only to the extent) that they simply 'are not' what they are distinguishable from. In other words, difference is 'contrastive' and 'competitive': difference decreases to the extent that union is achieved, while union is compromised in proportion to the actualisation of a distinguishable difference of one term in relation to another. Thus within the logic of 'pagan religion' (and secular liberalism), the distinction of one being from another is established by a 'relation of otherness'.
On the Christian logic of the relation of God and the world, by contrast, the difference between the creator and the creature involves, most fundamentally, the fact that creation only 'is' in relation to God, while God 'is' in himself and therefore irrespective of every relation to created reality. Sokolowski writes:
[I]n the Christian distinction God is understood as 'being' God entirely apart from any relation of otherness to the world or to the whole. God could and would be God even if there were no world. Thus the Christian distinction is appreciated as a distinction that did not have to be, even though it in fact is. The most fundamental thing we come to in Christianity, the distinction between the world and God, is appreciated as not being the most fundamental thing after all, because one of the terms of the distinction, God, is more fundamental than the distinction itself.
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On this logic, uncreated 'oneness' is more fundamental than created 'difference' (which is perfected in its integrity by proximity to the divine); or better, divine 'oneness' is the first term of the integrity and perfectibility of created 'difference'. Hence, Aquinas's doctrine of 'mixed relation', whereby God is not related to the world by any real relation, 94 a new stress on the 'individual' and the priority of the 'will') anticipates the problematic liberal ethos of sui iuris. Nestorianism is avoided, but only to the extent, it would seem, that the nomen dignitatis of the person is deracinated from being and given over to juridical perseity.
The alternative here is to follow Sempiternus Rex, beyond the dogmatic limit it set, into the radical unio of the Cyrilline Christology it proposed as expressed in Aquinas's doctrine of the single esse of Christ. If, for Aquinas, 'the person is perfectissimum ens', 109 then it is precisely in the singularity of Christ's esse that we find the key to the mystery of the person. Here the filiation of the Son is the first term of a receptive and Christological notion of human personhood, an idea of the human person that inevitably leads into the paradox the 'contradictory space of participation'. The truth of the human person, in this light, lies in the unum of the Incarnate Son and the impossible donum of participation in his persona mystica 110 .
